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ABSTRACT
Flood control has long been a major problem for
Phoenix, Tucson, Albuquerque and other southwestern boom
towns, and Las Vegas was no exception.

From its birth

in 1905 until the mid 1970s, the "Civil Law Doctrine"
was the legal concept used by courts and residents to
settle disputes over drainage problems.

Civil Law

dictated that land owners had to accept "hostile
upstream surface drainage" onto their property but could
discharge it onto the downstream property owner's land
with no legal liability.

This viewpoint coincided with

the frontier notion of individualism so popular in
Nevada and West.

Moreover, it also dovetailed with the

hallowed tradition of the less government intervention
in local affairs the better.

So, the Civil Law Doctrine

and the frontier mentality along with a low tax base and
a general distaste for government spending all conspired
to delay the establishment of a meaningful flood control
infrastructure in the Las Vegas Valley until the late
1980s.
Aside from the damages caused by the city's rapid
expansion over washes and flood plains in the 1960s and
1970s, the real breakthrough for flood control came in
1976 when Alfred Powers and others successfully
challenged the Civil Law Doctrine in District Court in a
iii

suite against Clark County.

This suit had far reaching

implications for the metropolitan area, because it
overturned the Civil Law Doctrine that had been the law
for 75 years in Nevada and for over 100 years in
California.

The court accepted another concept known as

the Reasonable Use Rule, which stipulated that each case
be judged on its own merits and that local governmental
approving agencies could be held liable for urban
development that caused increases in the ratio of
rainfall to runoff.

This change in legal thinking

altered the structure of urban development and local
governmental ideology concerning flood control in Las
Vegas as well as the Western United States.
This paper will argue that the court's decision to
change the guiding legal principle from the Civil Law
Doctrine to the Reasonable Use Rule in Nevada ended the
frontier viewpoint of individualism and replaced it with
a new spirit of communal action.

The legal revolution,

along with a series of events tied to the valley's
mushrooming urbanization energized the long dormant Las
Vegas Valley Flood Control District which quickly won
support in 1986 for implementing the flood control
agenda.

While emphasizing the legal dimension the paper

will place the court ruling within the context of the
city's urban sprawl and the growing political sentiment
favoring flood control.
iv
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INTRODUCTION

Speculation about flood control, or lack of it in
Las Vegas, has been a compelling community issue since
the founding of the city in 1905.

Early concern

developed over the problem with the arrival of the first
European-American settlers, and continues to be debated
today.

The passage of time, dimming of memories,

frontier parsimony, and lack of official records have
all contributed to the community's failure to develop a
comprehensive flood control history of the Las Vegas
Valley.

With factual data obscured, non-existent,

fragmented, or distorted, local leaders have relied on
newspaper accounts of past floods to guide them in the
decision making process.

Reports such as an article

that appeared in the Las Vegas Review Journal on 11
August 1991, proclaiming that "Flood projects chase
decades of neglect"1, often captured the attention of
the reading public, but rarely resulted in remedial
action to ameliorate the situation.
Accusing public officials of neglect has become the
standard journalistic theme postulated by the press
since the founding of the community.

Solutions to the

flood control problem, however, have not, and cannot, be
found in newspaper headlines.
1

Those answers remain
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hidden in the geological, intellectual, cultural,
political, and economic past of the community.
Las Vegas is situated in an artesian basin
completely surrounded by mountains.

Differences in

altitude within the area range from a high of 11,900
feet above mean sea level at Charleston peak in the
Spring Mountains to 1,200 feet on Lake Mead at Hoover
Dam.

The city's average elevation is approximately

2,000 feet above sea level.

Even though the Las Vegas

basin drains an area of 1590 square miles, the Las Vegas
Wash is the only outlet for storm water generated on the
watersheds.

All of the surface water, from morning dew

to the severest rain storms must pass through it
en-route to the discharge point at the Colorado River.2
The mountains surrounding Las Vegas are composed of
igneous rock interspersed with large deposits of exposed
sedimentary rock, including limestone, dolomite, shale,
and slate.

Layers of weathered multi-hued sandstone,

wrenched to the surface by eons of sub-surface folding
and faulting, indicate erosion from both wind and water.
Silt washed into the valley from eroded rock and
sandstone forms an alluvial fan in the lower part of the
basin.

Thick deposits of sandy loam on the valley floor

sustains a growth of green vegetation that boldly
contrasts against the inhospitable barrenness of the
surrounding desert.
Silt built up over eons had gone relatively unused
by early indigenous tribes of hunters and gatherers
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wandering across the valley floor prior to the arrival
of the first generation of European-American settlers
with their fences, orchards, and plowed fields.

Early

nomadic Paiute Indian tribes used the springs and shade
trees along Las Vegas Wash as temporary resting places
during their pilgrimages across southern Nevada's arid
desert.

Migratory Indians, unlike the newly arriving

European-American pioneers, enjoyed a special
relationship with nature that placed different values on
both land ownership and use.
The Indians lived with nature, harvesting fish,
game, roots, and herbs as they ripened, or came into
season much as a farmer harvests his crops of alfalfa
and grain.

Moreover, they exercised a communal

stewardship over the land that sanctioned tribal
territorial rights rather than personal control.

On the

other hand, European-Americans believed in private
ownership of land, fences, roads, buildings, livestock,
and agricultural equipment for the operation of their
farms and ranches.

Furthermore, the freedom of movement

enjoyed and practiced by nomadic aborigines in the
region emphasized their notion of communal land
ownership, and their ability to change home sites to
avoid natural disasters.

When faced with challenges

such as floods, Indians followed their instincts by
moving to the safety of high ground.

Whereas, European

settlers, bound by their system of private ownership,
remained at home to rebuild their damaged property.

4

Supported by a strong frontier mentality of selfreliance and independence, early European-Americans
settled into their new homes in the Las Vegas Basin, and
adjusted to periodic flooding that occasionally plagued
the valley.

Like the Indians before them, the settlers

considered storms as an inconvenience brought about by
nature.

Consequently, during the first part of the

twentieth century, townspeople in the Las Vegas Valley
acquired cheap land in other locations after a severe
flood, or lacking money for the acquisition of a new
safer location, cleaned up the debris and continued with
their lives.

Coping with flooding and the elements

became a personal challenge between the settlers, and
nature.

The triad of a small population, dry desert

weather, and an unfavorable "cost benefit ratio"3
contributed to the failure of pioneers to construct
flood control projects during the towns embryoic period.
Flood protection for the fledgling whistle stop on
the San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad became
an individual effort left to the discretion of the new
property owners, who had purchased building lots in the
townsite.

Early flood control measures to protect the

town and its people came from a reaction to periodic
downpours rather than from careful planning, designing,
and engineering against future destructive storms.
Without a positive, well engineered flood control system
the pioneers defied nature and accepted the harsh
environment as a normal condition of frontier life.
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On 11 August 1991, the Review Journal quoted a
present-day official of Clark County as saying that
"initial flood control was approached with a wild west
philosophy, where government oversight of developers was
limited."4

The argument that Las Vegans did nothing to

remedy the hazards of flooding was true, however it only
illustrated one facet of the problem.

Another issue

besides the wild west philosophy, centered on the lack
of ability or desire by local and Federal governmental
agencies to provide tax revenues for the construction of
flood works.

Furthermore, the influx of migrants to the

area shortly after the founding of Las Vegas also
hindered and delayed local efforts to address meaningful
development.

Seeking bargains in cheap land for

homesteads, newly arriving residents often purchased
property in gullies and natural washes for home sites,
blocked streambeds, and diverted flood water from
drainage swales to previously safe ground.

Taken

together, all of the unsupervised land development by
local people did more to retard the adoption of
protective flood control measures than any other single
event in the community's development.
Without funding for construction of flood works,
and using every means at their disposal, early residents
coped with the forces of nature and built a city in the
desert.

While it cannot be denied that massive

protective flood control works could have been more
cheaply constructed eighty five years ago, the city with
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a population of 5,000 or less during the early part of
the twentieth century, could not have supported such a
costly and ambitious project.

Furthermore, in the

earliest years of the town's existence, floods did not
threaten the community's safety.
Flood control has long been a major problem for
Phoenix, Tucson, Albuquerque and other southwestern boom
towns, and Las Vegas was no exception.

From its birth

in 1905 until the mid 1970s, the "Civil Law Doctrine"
was the legal concept used by courts and residents to
settle disputes over drainage problems.

Civil Law

required land owners to accept hostile upstream surface
drainage onto their property but could discharge it onto
the downstream property owner's land with no legal
liability.

This viewpoint coincided with the frontier

notion of individualism so popular in Nevada and the
West.

It also dovetailed with the hallowed tradition of

the less government intervention in local affairs the
better.

So, the Civil Law Doctrine and the frontier

mentality along with a low tax base and a general
distaste for government spending all conspired to delay
the establishment of a meaningful flood control
infrastructure in the Las Vegas Valley until the late
1980s.
Aside from the damages caused by the city's rapid
expansion over washes and flood plains in the 1960s and
1970s, the real breakthrough for flood control came in
1976 when Alfred Powers and others successfully
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challenged the Civil Law Doctrine in District Court in a
suite against Clark County.

This suit had far reaching

implications for the metropolitan area, because it
overturned the Civil Law Doctrine that had been the law
for 75 years in Nevada and for over 100 years in
California.

The court accepted another concept known as

the Reasonable Use Rule, which stipulated that each case
be judged on its own merits and that local governmental
approving agencies could be held liable for urban
development that increased the ratio of rainfall to
runoff.

This change in legal thinking altered the

structure of urban development and local governmental
ideology concerning flood control in Las Vegas as well
as the western United States.
The focus of this paper is the development of flood
control in the Las Vegas Valley between 1905 and 1976.
Central to the thesis is the argument that legal,
intellectual, political, and economic forces
unintentionally conspired to diminish the community's
will for the planning and construction of flood control
projects.

At the present time, it is not enough for Las

Vegans to dismiss the past with a few sentences about
the failure or perceived inaction of the city's founders
concerning the problem.

Instead, we must understand the

forces that acted upon the intellectual, political, and
economic environment of the community in order to
establish a more accurate history of flood control in
the Las Vegas Valley.

CHAPTER I
FLOOD CONTROL IN LAS VEGAS
1905 TO 1955

By April 1905, over fifteen hundred people had
erected temporary homes and shelters in the McWilliams
Townsite, and along the Las Vegas Creek.1

Like the

early Mormon settlers, who settled the oasis in 1855,
new inhabitants to Las Vegas sought relief from the
searing desert sun beneath the shade of cottonwood trees
along the stream bed.

The creek starts its journey to

the sea in the hills west of Las Vegas, and meanders
southeasterly for approximately 45 miles before
discharging into the lower reaches of the Las Vegas
Wash.
Without an abundance of fresh water from the
springs and creek, Las Vegas could not have developed as
a community, nor survived as a city.

Pioneers in the

valley avoided building in, or obstructing existing
washes that served as natural conduits for drainage from
watershed areas surrounding the basin.

Instead, they

sought high mesas of loamy silt on the alluvial fan that
provided safety from flooding.

Recognizing that nature

had established drainage swales and gullies in crucial
8
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locations to carry runoff from homes, farms, and ranches
to the lower Las Vegas Wash, farmers periodically
cleared debris and trash from them allowing surface
drainage to flow in an unimpeded manner to its
destination.

Intelligent use of existing un-disturbed

terrain enabled farmers to produce abundant harvests of
fruit, hay, grain, and vegetables to feed the expanding
local population.
During the first decades of settlement in the Las
Vegas Basin, the need for artificial drainage channels
as protection from flooding was not necessary.

Even

though the organizers of Clark's Las Vegas Townsite in
1905 had engineered, surveyed, and laid the townsite out
into lots, blocks, streets, and school sites, they
neither planned, nor provide for, surface drainage.

The

east-west streets, following the natural drainage
pattern, provided the only method for nuisance or storm
water to leave the townsite.
Four major factors influenced the community's
failure to enact a positive flood control system in the
valley during first half of the twentieth century.

The

first was the disturbance to the natural drainage
pattern caused by construction of the San Pedro, Los
Angeles and Salt Lake railroad.

A second disruption

came in the 1920s and 193 0s with the construction of the
Salt Lake Highway, which paralleled the railroad's route
and adopted the same drainage procedures.

The third

factor was the opening of the Boulder Highway in 1931
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between Boulder City and Las Vegas an artery that cut
across all of the natural washes that flowed from west
to east between both entities impeding the free flow of
storm water into the lower Las Vegas Wash.2

Finally,

the fourth and most serious impediment to the
advancement of flood control policy evolved from the
provincial frontier mentality of both settlers and local
officials who opposed excessive governmental spending.
The railroad built Las Vegas and, at the same time
helped create the flooding problem.

In 1904, railroad

construction crews pushed their steel rails southward
into the valley establishing a division point, round
house, and maintenance facility.

Water played a leading

role in site selection for the route as well as the new
townsite.

Cognizant of the water requirements of steam

powered locomotives when pulling long trains across the
hot dry desert, railroad engineers sought locations for
division towns along the proposed route that provided
water, food, and home sites for their employees.
Following standard engineering and construction
practice in use at the turn of the twentieth century,
the railroad installed a system of culverts in the
larger washes supplemented with wing ditches that
diverted storm water from smaller gullies into the major
channels.

However, lack of foresight by railroad

engineers to perceive future urban development precluded
the acquisition of easements and rights-of-ways for run
off channels in washes and gullies that had been deemed
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by the railroad to be waste land, with little or no
value.3
Clark's Townsite and railroad shops, located on the
alluvial fan between the two major drainage channels
rarely experienced major destruction from floods, unless
a rain storm swept directly over the town.

Likewise,

although flash flooding did not constitute a problem
during the early years of the city, it became a primary
source of concern in later years because of inadequate
building regulation and a rapid rise in the community's
population.4

By 1920, population growth coupled with

inexpensive land induced many newly arriving settlers to
build homes and businesses in marginal areas that had
previously been considered unsafe because of flood
hazards.
The earliest townsmen coped with periodic storms,
and property damage on an individual basis, because they
had no other recourse.

A small tax base, lack of

governmental funding, and failure to develop a
comprehensive plan for flood control projects forced the
settlers to rely upon individual solutions for their
preservation.

Furthermore, local leaders within the

community usually followed the less politically popular
expedient of keeping taxes low rather than proposing
flood control works.

In times of crisis, Las Vegans

responded favorably to the challenges of nature and the
appeals from their political leaders with enterprise,
individualism, and self-assurance.
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From the city's inception in 1905 hostile flood
waters prompted problems between adjacent land owners,
city owned streets, rights-of-ways and other properties.
By necessity residents had to establish a flood control
strategy that excluded the expenditure of large amounts
of capital.

Confined between the parameters of

self-help and a parsimonious government, local planning
officials had little latitude for innovation.
Consequently, community leaders developed inexpensive
solutions that relied upon legal remedies coupled with
individualism.
Rainstorms usually generated little or no property
damage to Las Vegas before the 1920s.

Newspaper

accounts of flooding indicate that during the early part
of the twentieth century, Las Vegans became hostage to
floods that occurred in other parts of southern Nevada,
rather than local rainstorms.

Frequent destruction of

the railroad line caused by natural disasters meant a
suspension of trade and commerce between the outside
world and the community.

Above all else, people living

in the isolated Southern Nevada oasis recognized that
their lives and fortunes depended upon the success and
well being of the railroad.
Today, we can only imagine the emotions of local
residents concerning stability of life on the frontier
as they picked up the Las Vegas Age on 9 March 1907 and
scanned the headlines that boldly proclaimed: "60 miles
of track destroyed and no trains to Salt Lake for 30
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days, Las Vegas Marooned".5

The thirty day interruption

of rail service, stopped trade, food supplies, mail, and
commerce from the northern and eastern parts of the
United States.

It demoralized the townspeople, and

reduced the city to an isolated outpost in the desert.
Unhappily for the community, the railroad provided the
only rapid means of passage across the arid desert of
the Great Basin, and diminution of the service
constituted a serious setback for the fledgling town.
During floods and other natural disasters the
average Las Vegan tightened his belt and accepted such
calamities as acts of "God" to be dealt with by the
railroad company or local political leaders.

On 9 March

1907, the editor of the Las Vegas Age voiced the
prevalent sentiment of the townspeople that it must be
.

'

'

'

plain to railroad management that passengers and freight
would avoid the Salt Lake rail line in storm seasons
rather than take the risk of being wrecked in Meadow
Valley Canyon.

In short, the editor attempted to raise

the public consciousness by asking the question: "How
many more lives must be sacrificed before removal of the
Salt Lake track from the river bed to a safe position
above high water is completed?"6
More than anything else, the shortsighted argument
by the press that flooding was the railroad's concern,
and not society's problem, added to the community's
failure to develop a regional blue print for flood
control.

Here again, we can see a single minded theme

14

calling for reliance upon individualism rather than
marshalling the community's collective social conscience
for the development of a realistic flood control system.
Although Las Vegans knew that flooding posed a
threat to life and property, danger from storms usually
concerned the railroad at a considerable distance from
Las Vegas.

Significantly, the notion that "it can't

happen here" reinforced reluctance to pursue a
comprehensive flood control plan.

Moreover, newspaper

accounts of early floods in southern Nevada focused
primarily on the railroads and farm communities of the
Meadow and Muddy River Valleys.

This emphasis supported

the atavistic notion of false security.
The fragility of Las Vegas's life line to the
outside world continued to be expressed in the headlines
of the daily papers.

On 24 March 1906, the Las Vegas

Age reported that washouts had occurred in the Cajon
Pass in southern California forcing the Salt Lake
Limited (a passenger train) to be re-routed through San
Francisco.7

Additionally, the storm caused a

devastating washout north of Moapa requiring 350 workers
to be moved from Las Vegas to the flooded area to
facilitate repairs.

Railroad officials estimated that

it would take at least ten days to repair the tracks and
possibly result in twenty to thirty days of interrupted
train service.

The City of Las Vegas received only

minor wind damage, but once again became isolated from
the outside world.8
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During the first week of January 1910, a massive
storm struck Southern Nevada.

Although it did not flood

Las Vegas the local press described it as the most
destructive storm in recent years.

The deluge washed

out one hundred miles of railroad track in Meadow Valley
Wash, no trains ran between Las Vegas and Salt Lake City
for nearly six months.

Raging through the Muddy Valley,

the storm destroyed crops, live stock, and fences
leaving only devastation in its wake.

One farmer lost

60 hogs while the Moapa Improvement Company at Logan,
Nevada lost sixty acres of grain and fifty acres of
asparagus due to silting.9
According to the earliest newspaper accounts of
damage caused by rain storms following heavy rains, Las
Vegas appeared to have been spared large scale
destruction.

Moreover, it had managed to deal

effectively with flooding problems without large
man-made flood control works.

In other words, storm

damage to the local infrastructure prior to the 1920s
was not large enough to be considered newsworthy.
More typically, storms of short duration merely
washed out roads and caused minor damage to local homes.
On 19 July 1919, a reporter observed that "Jupiter
Pluvious" briefly visited Las Vegas with rain drops as
large as satsuma plums.

The storm deposited 1.10 inches

of rainfall on the community, with no damage to homes in
the area.

Some dirt roads in the county had been

slightly damaged, but the journalist characterized the
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storm as a "cool refreshing downpour."10
One of the most devastating storms to hit Las
Vegas occurred on 28 July, 1923.

The Las Vegas Age

reported a torrential downpour that centered over the
city causing severe damage to individuals as well as
business establishments.

Several buildings had been

struck by lightning, a garage collapsed, and on 8th
street, the wind blew a building down.

Out at Ladd's

Development, the bath house collapsed and fell into a
swimming pool causing thousands of dollars in damages.
The building which was heaviest hit was the Union
Pacific Railroad shop, it suffered lightning strikes in
several places.11
By 1923, seasonal storm patterns had been well
established and the summer months defined and recognized
as the rainy season.

The United States Army Corps of

Engineers reported in its flood analysis of the Las
Vegas Wash, published in 1959, that large floods had
occurred in Las Vegas and vicinity in July 1923, August
1931, and June 1955.

Furthermore, most floods in the

area resulted from thunder storms during the summer
season, when all precipitation fell as rain in the
mountains, although some flooding had also occurred in
February, March, October, and November.

An average of

thirteen thunderstorms per year had fallen on the Las
Vegas area over a twenty-one year period from 1937-57.
According to the Army engineers, the floods of June 1923
and August 1931 surpassed that of June 1955 in
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magnitude.12
From its inception, Las Vegas had searched for
inexpensive methods to provide flood protection for its
people.

Like the railroad, the city relied on the use

of natural washes and gullies for drainage while, at the
same time, neglecting to provide rights-of-ways for
surface water discharging from streets, roads, and
ditches into existing washes.

Extending ditches into

the desert without clearly defined rights-of-ways left
flood areas open to developers, who sought to maximize
their profits by building homes, and commercial projects
on cheap, marginal land within flood plains.
As the city began to grow and expand after its
founding in 1905, engineers and planning officials faced
a more complicated set of circumstances than the
original railroad designers had dealt with upon their
arrival in the valley.

The railroad remained fixed in

its original location with a static drainage equation.
At the same time, the city enlarged its physical
boundaries and population, creating and intensifying the
probability of flood hazards.

Furthermore, the town had

to protect streets and public property, as well as
adjudicate problems arising from surface waters entering
and leaving private property.

In short, the railroad

constituted a one-time project, whereas the city's
continued growth magnified drainage problems by
concentrating the flow of storm water from streets into
washes that nature had created but had not designed to
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carry large volumes of runoff.
Seeking the most economical method to deal with
storms and the attendant damage, public works officials
directed their attention to legal as well as engineering
solutions.

Lawyers and engineers concluded that the

simplest and least expensive system entailed the
acceptance of surface water into streets and ditches
alongside the roads from abutting properties, than
disposing of the storm runoff by directing it into the
nearest natural wash through major east-west arteries.
To complement the surface water carriage system,
officials adopted a legal system that provided standard,
predictable methods for ameliorating friction between
property owners forced to accept drainage water from
abutting neighbors.
After reviewing the three basic rules governing
flood waters, city and county commissioners selected the
"civil law rule"13 as the legal principle that best
suited the needs of the community.

The civil law rule

recognized that a servitude of natural drainage existed
between adjoining lands, so that the lower owner had to
accept surface water that drained onto his land.

On the

other hand, the upstream neighbor had no right to alter
the natural system of drainage so as to increase the
burden on the lower property owners.14
The doctrine had its inception in Roman law and the
Code Napoleon and had been predicated upon the concept
that those buying or acquiring land should be required
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to accept the burdens of natural drainage entering their
property as well as discharging surface water into its
natural downstream channel.

The civil law doctrine had

the advantage that property rights could be readily
predictable.15

Among the legal options available to

Las Vegans, the Civil Law Rule fit local needs more
closely than other legal doctrines available to them at
the time.

The underlying concept of the Civil Law rule

that advocated private responsibility over governmental
action clearly favored inept community leaders, because
it permitted them to dodge the difficult choices
inherent in a confrontation over the issue, and instead
allowed them to follow the easy path of political
expediency.
In its pristine condition, soil in the Las Vegas
Basin tends to act as a blotter during rain storms.
Porous and granular natural ground absorbs a certain
amount of water while trapping other surface drainage in
depressions or low spots in the ground.

Gradual

infiltration and pooling of flowing water across the
soil tends to retard the advance of flood water, while
decreasing its capacity for erosion.

Altering the

infrastructure by constructing dwellings, streets,
sidewalks, and other urban requirements increases the
ratio of rainfall to runoff by creating an artificially
impervious surface that fails to trap or absorb storm
water, increases its velocity, and multiplies the
destructive scouring ability of the runoff.

Rain
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falling on roof tops, paved streets, sidewalks, and
other covered areas drains on to neighboring down stream
property with more potential for damage than it normally
develops in its undisturbed condition.
The civil law rule required every citizen in the
valley to take care of themselves, while respecting
their neighbors' rights.

It is here, that we can

conceptualize the meshing of a frontier ideology,
inadequate funding, and short sighted leadership.
Additionally, these fundamental physical and ideological
qualities continued to guide the community until 4 June
1980 when the Nevada Supreme Court, in a landmark case,
overturned an appeal to an unfavorable ruling in a law
suit by the Clark County Flood Control District.

In its

decision the court replaced the seventy year old
doctrine of civil law rule with "The third surface water
doctrine generally known as the "rule of reasonable
use."16
In 1923, the Las Vegas Age reported that Las Vegas
represented a progressive rural county seat with a
population of 3,000, and expectations of reaching 10,000
by 1925.17 According to the reporter, the town prided
itself in being the county seat of Clark County, Nevada,
headquarters of the United States Reclamation Service
for work on the Boulder Canyon Damsite, and a paradise
for farmers.

Moreover, the area contained 100,000 acres

of fertile land in a proven artesian belt, with ideal
conditions for growing peaches, pears, apricots, prunes,
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plums, apples, grapes, pecans, almonds, melons, cotton,
hemp, and alfalfa, with as many as seven crops of
alfalfa per year.18
The strength and weakness of early Las Vegans,
resided in their provincialism, and the belief that they
represented pioneers living on the last frontier
carrying on the tradition of manifest destiny, and a
living expression of Fredrick Jackson Turner's concept
of the American frontier.19 Indeed they prided
themselves on their uniqueness.

In May 1923, the month

before one of the largest floods of record to fall on
the community, the Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover
wrote a series of timely messages to the American
people.

His thesis was "American Individualism"20, and

it received wide acclaim in the Las Vegas A g e .
He wrote that "the American pioneer is the epic
expression of that individualism, and the pioneer spirit
is the response to the challenge of opportunity, to the
challenge of nature, to the challenge of life, to the
call of the frontier."

Moreover, he declared that

"American individualism had received much of its
character from contacts with the forces of nature."21
Here again, the significance of popular rhetoric from
the nation's leaders, with the parsimonious dispensation
of public works funds combined to support the local
concept that the remedy for flood control lay in the
realm of the private sector.
Land developers and builders relied on the theory
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of caveat emptor (buyer beware) when selling prospective
home owners a new house that had been built in the
middle of an existing wash.

Cheap land, coupled with

minimal building restrictions, made it easier to move to
higher ground after a flood than to stay and rebuild in
a proven flood hazard.

County and City public works

officials, lacking financial resources to design and
construct adequate flood control works to safeguard the
public, simply reviewed plans and approved building
permit submittals.

As late as 1975, Clark County,

Nevada continued to rely on the secondary solution of
using streets to carry surface runoff during storms.
After the railroad, the second major project to
affect the natural drainage of Las Vegas was the
construction of the Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Salt Lake
highway (U. S. Highway #91).

Paralleling the railroad

and conforming to the same general drainage pattern, the
highway, built in the 1920s and 1930s reinforced the
short-sighted concept that negated the need of
rights-of-ways for building positive drainage structures
in future years.

The Nevada State Highway Department

erected culverts and bridges in the same general washes
as the railroad, but no rights-of-ways for surface run
off had been secured to handle the water after it left
the highway property.22
The third major displacement to the natural
drainage system in the Las Vegas Valley resulted from
the construction of Boulder Highway in 1931.

The
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two-lane highway became the critical artery connecting
Las Vegas to Boulder City during the construction of
Hoover Dam.

The proximity of Las Vegas to the dam site,

and the recognition that Las Vegas was the closest rail
head as well as the nearest metropolitan center of any
consequence to the construction site mandated that a
connecting highway be built between the two growing
cities.

The Nevada State Highway Department awarded

it's first contract for construction on the roadway in
1924.

Designated as contract number 117, the new

highway improvements followed the old Searchlight
roadbed.

The significance of the highway from a flood

control view-point rested on the certainty that the
location of the new arterial disturbed all of the
natural drainage courses that flowed from west to east,
and that discharged into the Las Vegas wash between the
two cities.
Even into the 1920s, no major flood control
channels had been constructed in anticipation of future
growth in the valley.

During the 1930s the highway

provided a route for the influx of workers, their
families and attendant supporting businesses between the
two rapidly expanding cities.

The once open desert land

alongside the highway soon began to sprout homes,
businesses, shanty towns, and tent cities that continued
to grow and expand into the 1950s.
On 30 August 1927, floods deluged Las Vegas.

The

Searchlight road (later renamed the Boulder Highway)
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suffered more damage than any other area in Southern
Nevada.

According to County Road Supervisor King it was

eighty percent washed out.

King estimated that repairs

to the road-way could go as high as several thousand
dollars for full repairs.23

Even after flooding, as the

city, county, and state road maintenance crews continued
to dry out and make repairs, local officials made no
concerted effort to organize a flood control plan for
the area.
Undeveloped land along both sides of the Boulder
Highway became prime areas for the development of small
roadside businesses and campsites for new Hoover Dam
workers arriving daily from all parts of the country.
Many of the prospective employees looking for employment
at the dam site depended on the automobile for
transportation to and from the project, and slept in
shanties, tents, and makeshift shacks along side of the
roadway.

Whitney (just north of todays Henderson) was

one of these sites, and although closer to the Dam site
than Las Vegas it had the misfortune of being located in
a flood prone area (see appendix A ) .
Indeed in August 1942 a major flood damaged the
area.

A tent city between Whitney and Midway on Boulder

highway was virtually destroyed after a heavy rain storm
sent a wall of water through the camp and over the
highway.

Several of the tents had been split open by

the force of the water, and many of the campers had to
hang all of their water soaked belongings on mesquite
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bushes to dry.24

Here again, the old self reliant

frontier mentality continued to work, with the campers
in the tent city near Whitney.
The County's overworked building and safety
officials overlooked the erection of homes on cheap land
adjacent to washes and flood plains previously
considered unfit for human habitation.

Moreover, in

some cases officials sympathized with the campers
because of the hard economic conditions brought about by
the great depression of the 193 0s, and looked the other
way rather than evict them from their barren desert
campsites.

In any case, many of the original squatters

improved their temporary quarters with more substantial
buildings, replacing the earlier tents and shacks with
permanent structures.
The public only finally began to focus its
attention on flooding in the 1930s after newspaper
articles described flood hazards in terms of near
disaster.

Although many areas had been flooding for

years, no one had observed the damage at first hand, or
more often considered cheap land on a flood plain to be
marginal for development.

It required keen eyed land

speculators to fully evaluate the profit potential of
the desert flood plains in southern Nevada.

However,

water soaked, mud covered, homes, when silhouette
against a background of multicolored sandstone mountains
made a striking contrast for the news-hungry reporters
whose lurid descriptions of the disasters captured the
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public attention.
Two factors influenced growth in southern Nevada
during the 1930s.
plains in the area.

Both seriously impinged on flood
Legalization of gambling and the

attendant attraction of tourism can be seen as the first
major step that led to massive growth in both the city
and county.

These changes brought tourists in growing

numbers making the area one of the most highly developed
and popular resort centers in the United States.25

More

than anything else, the frontier spirit of Nevadans led
to the acceptance of wide open legal gambling, with
table games and card rooms as a growth industry in
Nevada.

Las Vegas proudly proclaimed itself the "Last

Frontier".
In the 1940s, Las Vegas continued to expand
especially to the south and east filling in gaps between
the main streets and highways, while following water and
sewer line locations that had been approved in a
piecemeal fashion for construction by the city and
county governments that worked from no adequate overall
plan.

The result was a hodge-podge of developments

based largely on an unsystematic infrastructure.
Primitive or non-existent building restrictions, and the
shortage of building and on-site inspectors guaranteed a
proliferation of sub-standard construction.
Furthermore, the lack of inspection led to inadequate
safeguards necessary for the safe development of the
community.
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Between 1905 and 1940, few records of rainfall and
damages had been carefully documented.

The newspapers

contain the best source of information on storms for the
early years of Las Vegas.

Clearly, lack of data

hampered flood control officials in later years, when
inaction could no longer be tolerated, and it became
imperative to act in the public interest for the
protection of lives and property.
During World War II, the need for the establishment
of the U.S. Army Gunnery range set the stage for the
largest population explosion since the construction of
Hoover Dam in the early 1930s.

The United States Army,

located its Gunnery Range along the south side of Salt
Lake Highway, and west of Sunrise Mountain, the most
flood proof area in the valley.
Las Vegas traditionally receives most of its flood
water from the North and West in the opposite quadrants
from the Sunrise Mountain area.

Knowing this, the Army

Corps of Engineers had reviewed the air base's proposed
location in advance of its construction in 1941.

Good

engineering and site selection precluded major damage in
later years to the airfield during storms while, at the
same time, Las Vegas suffered millions of dollars in
property damage and loss of life.
With the Army base slated to open in January 1942,
wives, dependents, and camp followers flocked to the
city in late 1941, overwhelming the housing market and
forcing the construction of new schools, streets and an
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utility networks.

Even the most naive and

unsophisticated, government officials knew that changes
in the existing infrastructure had to keep pace with the
expanding population.

Many of these army families would

return after the war and settle permanently in the
valley, adding their voices to the growing call for
change.

CHAPTER II
PUBLIC AWARENESS AND COMMUNITY ACTION
1950— 1963

While the pressures to establish a major flood
control system mounted during the New Deal and
especially during the war years, the turning point in
the frontier ideology for Las Vegans began in early 1949
after a series of heavy thunder storms struck the city.
Massive destruction caused by flooding forced municipal
officials to reconsider their traditional attitude about
the problem.

They began searching for realistic

alternatives to the situation.

At the same time, public

discontent compelled inert local governmental bodies to
discontinue harboring notions of individual self-help as
a means of combating flooding, and to begin exploring
alternate methods for collective security.

Compulsion

from social, economic, and political forces such as the
expanding military facility at Nellis Air Force Base, a
heavy influx of discharged veterans and their families,
a surge of war weary tourists, the growth of the divorce
and gambling industries, and to some extent, the
industrialization of the Henderson area all demanded
relief from flooding.
29
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After the storm of 1 August 1949 that injured three
people and cost tens of thousands of dollars in damages,
concerned citizens began to guestion the city and
county's ability to act responsibly in its search for
alternate methods for flood protection.

Impatient with

the slow progress and vacillation of elected
representatives, ordinary people formed ad hoc citizens
committees to deal with the problem.
One such group started in Marrachie Flats, a small
residential area located in North Las Vegas.1

On 4

August 1949, a loose association of eighteen residents
held a neighborhood meeting, and drafted a petition to
the Clark County Commission demanding that government
adopt a strong flood control policy.
signed the petition.

All in attendance

The central argument of the

committee focused on the proposition that positive
action to control flooding had to be taken by elected
county officials.

In fairness, they noted that although

Marrachie Flats had not been totally destroyed, it had
been severely damaged, and could not withstand another
storm.
Suggesting that the cost of any remedy would not
exceed future losses due to property damage, the
petitioners advocated several methods to ameliorate the
situation.

Their recommendations included construction

of earth check dams, retention basins for storage of
storm water, and a modern road system complete with
culverts to channel overflow water under roads without
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destroying the road bed.

Moreover, they commented on

damage to the soil from sheet flow, and the consequences
to Hoover Dam from silting action that had resulted from
the storm.

The committee also urged that a flood

control district be formed to set a positive agenda of
safeguards to control floods and minimize damages, such
as the community had experienced during and following
the storm of 31 July 1949.2
The residents forwarded their petition to the
County Commission, and the ad hoc citizens committee
planned its second session for 21 August 1949.
meeting, W.A.

At that

Reynolds, chairman of the committee,

reported that surface water washing out of flooded
septic tanks and cesspools had infiltrated many water
wells in the Marrachie Flats area.

Committee members

demanded that County Commissioners be advised of the
contaminated wells as soon as possible.

At the same

time, the committee questioned the prudence of County
Commissioners allowing Vegas Heights, Bellview Heights
and other housing projects to alter the natural drainage
and discharge flood water into Marrachie Flats without
making any provision for safeguarding the interests of
local inhabitants.3
The Civil Law Doctrine, with all of its
ramifications and shortcomings clearly evidenced itself
in the Marrachie Flats situation.

An increase in the

ratio of rainfall to runoff brought about by the
construction of housing projects and urban
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infrastructure flooded and contaminated the water wells
in an area that had previously been secure.

Under the

law, home owners had been compelled to accept the
diversion of storm water and its subsequent
contamination to their water wells with little or no
legal recourse.

Determined to alter this laissez-faire

approach, the Marrachie group formulated an alternative
for presentation to the County Commissioners for
consideration.
The strength of the plan proposed by the Marrachie
Committee manifested itself in a resolution addressed to
the County Commission that suggested five fundamental
principles.

First, it recommended that a separate flood

control district be formed with one County Commissioner
on the board.

Second, it recommended that the new

district make provisions for financial aid from local,
county, state, and federal agencies for money to fund
flood control works.

Third, it suggested that taxation

should be explored as a means of financing flood control
works.

Fourth, that provisions be made for the actual

construction of flood control works in the Las Vegas
Valley.

Fifth, that measures be undertaken for the

continuous maintenance of flood works after they are
constructed.4

Most of these recommendations later

became state law, and formed the basis of flood control
policy in southern Nevada.
It is significant to note that while the Marrachie
group espoused the activist spirit of the frontier by
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challenging the status quo, it simultaneously embraced
the progressive ideology that government experts and
bureaucrats know what is in the public interest.

More

broadly, the group believed that government experts had
at their disposal sufficient expertise acquired from
other areas that had experienced similar problems, and
could step in and remedy local flooding problems with a
minimum of effort.
On 29 November 1949, Helen Scott Reed, County Clerk
and Ex-officio Clerk of the Clark County Commission
responded to the petition.

At the request of the County

Commission, she wrote to Doctor Reed Bailey of the
United States Forestry Service in Ogden, Utah.

In her

letter to Doctor Bailey, the County Clerk solicited his
aid in obtaining a flood control survey for the Las
Vegas Valley.

She noted that a survey in the Virgin

River-Meadow Valley Wash district in Southern Nevada
approached completion, and that this would be an
opportune time to come into the Las Vegas area.5
In his response, Bailey stated that the small size
of his flood control survey staff precluded any
immediate attempt to start a Clark County survey.
Furthermore, plans needed to be approved in advance by
the Secretary of Agriculture and the budget bureau,
because appropriations from Congress required approval
for specific annual programs.

In addition, he explained

that his department had been committed to a two year
project on the Columbia River Basin that precluded any
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possibility of starting new work in Southern Nevada.

At

the same time, he advised her that the United States
Department of

Agriculture had tentatively planned a

similar basin

wide survey of the Colorado River and its

tributaries, but still lacked the funding.6
Bailey's letter of response was prompt, short and
to the point.
project.

His department had no funds for the

Financing would have to be approved and

provided in advance by the Secretary in Washington, D.C.
and the department was already committed to other
projects for at least the next two years.

Clearly, the

United States Forestry Department was in no position to
help Las Vegas alleviate its flooding problem.
More floods hastened city-county efforts for a
solution.

On

of an inch of
hours.

8 September1950, a cloudburst dumped

0.62

water on the city in little more than two

Fremont and Charleston Boulevards suffered the

heaviest damage.

Water swept through the Mayfair

Addition seeping under door sills, destroying carpets,
furniture, and lawns.

The subdivision had been built

across the natural drainage on the flood plain
downstream from Clark's Las Vegas Townsite during the
Second World War.

Streets in Mayfair had been

constructed in a north-south direction while the
principal drainage carrying streets in Clark's Townsite
ran in an east-west direction.

Thus, the drainage from

Clark's Townsite drained into the subdivision, blocking
storm water seeking its way to the lower Las Vegas
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Wash.7

Years of suburban home construction on the flood

plain finally had claimed a high price in water damage
to the residents of Mayfair.
Again on 20 July 1951, Nellie Bunch, Postmaster of
Whitney, reported that water surged over Boulder Highway
and stood eight inches deep in some yards (see Appendix
A ) .8

On 22 August 1951, another thunderstorm hit the

city of Las Vegas shutting down telephone communications
and causing power outages. It struck the Vegas Heights
area so hard that some residents saw people paddling
rubber boats through the streets.9

The pressing need

for flood protection could no longer be ignored, and as
a result, County Commissioners intensified their search
for help.
On 7 September 1951, Rodney Colton Chairman of the
Clark County Commission, wrote to Nevada Senator Pat
McCarran asking him to lobby in behalf of federal flood
control funding for Las Vegas.

He also enclosed the

letters that had been exchanged between Helen Scott Reed
and Doctor Reed Bailey of the United States Forestry
Service in 1949.

Colton indicated that after

investigating the damages from recent rain storms, and
the community's inability to solve the problem on a
piecemeal basis, the County Commission had decided that
the only feasible alternative was to develop a flood
control program.

More than anything else, Colton

believed that the county needed federal monetary and
technical assistance.

In short, Colton suggested to
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Senator McCarran that because of the immense cost
involved in flood control construction perhaps, the
commission would have to work with some federal
agencies.10
After nearly a half century of benevolent neglect,
the county finally began to act.

It recognized that a

flood control problem existed and that the local
community could not handle it alone.

Determined in

their search for federal assistance, Commissioners
sought help from Nevada's Congressional delegation in
Washington, D.C..

On 13 November 1951, Nevada's

Democratic Congressman Walter Baring responded by
writing Lt. Colonel Wright Hiatt, Deputy Director of
Civil Works for Flood Control, Corps of Engineers,
United States Army.

In his letter he enclosed the

previously mentioned correspondence between the county
and Doctor Reed of the Forestry Service.
Representative Baring relayed the information that
a meeting had been held in Las Vegas on 8 March 1950 for
the specific purpose of discussing flood control issues
facing that area.

Officials of the Department of

Agriculture expressed their willingness to cooperate
with local interests, indicating that in their opinion
flood problems affecting the city of Las Vegas and
adjacent areas seemed similar to those previously
encountered in cities of similar size by the Corps of
Engineers in its flood control investigations.il
Hiatt forwarded the letter from Congressman Baring
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to the Chief of Engineers in Washington, D.C. who sent a
favorable and speedy response.

In his response to

Baring, General Chorpening indicated that Senate Bill
1020, authorizing a preliminary examination and survey
for flood control and allied purposes of Las Vegas Wash
and tributaries, had been passed by the Senate on 9
August 1951.

Furthermore, it had been favorably

reported without amendment in the House of
Representatives, as Report No. 1200, on 17 October 1951.
Additionally, General Chorpening advised that the bill
remained on the House calendar, and if passed into law,
the investigation would be assigned to the Division
Engineer, South Pacific Division.12
Baring relayed this information to Helen Scott
Reed and assured her that "you may be sure that when
this measure comes before the House for action it will
receive my utmost support."13

The legislative package

moved through Congress after receiving letters of
recommendation from both Frank Pace Jr., Secretary of
the Army and Charles F. Brannan, Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture. Two agencies, the Corps of
Engineers and the Department of Agriculture, assigned
committees to provide interim guidance to Clark County
during this period.14
On 27 May 1952, various government officials met in
the County Extension Agent's Office. In was attendance
was Warren Murphy-Field representative of the Secretary
of Agriculture, for Pacific South West region, Harry
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Jamison, Water Conservation, Hugh Shamberger, Nevada
State Engineer, Henry L. Lobstein, chief of flood
control survey, Inter-mountain forest and range
experiment station of the United States Forestry
Service, and many other local participants with an
interest in the ongoing flood control problem.

Every

agency present declared its for controlling the flood
hazards threatening the valley, but until such time as a
flood control district could be formed to collect and
evaluate data accumulated by the government, no work
could be performed.15 Clark County had to establish a
responsible agency to handle the correspondence and to
assume a leadership role in coordinating the various
federal and state agencies.
The task facing community leaders focused on
overcoming bureaucratic red tape, and moving the
principal actors off dead center.

They needed action

not meetings; letters and inter-departmental squabbling
over jurisdiction could not be tolerated.

The citizens

in the Las Vegas Valley with their take charge frontier
attitude continued to agitate local public officials to
bring the area into the mainstream of contemporary flood
control technology.
In 1954 and 1955, flooding became even more severe
than it had been in past years.

It reached crisis

proportions because the city continued to grow without
necessary flood protection measures to insure the safety
of the public.

Land developers and governmental
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officials still elected to have streets designed as
conduits for surface drainage while continuing to
authorize subdivisions on cheap land located in or near
washes and flood plains.

On 27 June 1954, a series of

cloudbursts struck Las Vegas causing the worst deluge in
years.
As the result of the storm, Mayor James French of
Henderson added his voice to the growing chorus of
public officials demanding action instead of rhetoric
from the County Commissioners over the lack of flood
control.

Boulder Highway had been the hardest hit area

in Clark County.

One Deputy Sheriff on duty told

reporters

that "the highway must have been built in an

old wash,

because the water [ran] due east along side of

the road."16

French, told reporters that the city had

hired everyone it could find to help salvage at least
100 homes

in the Federal Home Development on the east

side of the highway.

On 3 August 1954, he wrote the

County Commission stressing the seriousness of flood
problems in Henderson and proposed that all of the
municipalities within the county join together in a
joint flood control effort.17
The County Commissioners responded on 11 August
1954, that the Board of Commissioners together with the
flood control committees from all of the entities
located in the valley had petitioned the assistance of
Hugh Shamberger, Nevada's State Engineer, United States
Senator George Malone, Senator Pat McCarran, and former
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congressman Walter Baring for assistance in the matter.
All of the agencies petitioned for help had responded
that they would work with the various county
departments, and do everything in their power to support
a program.18

Despite all of their assurances, another

year passed before the Nevada State Legislature enacted
laws enabling local communities to take positive
remedial action.
Enumerated in the Nevada Revised Statutes as NRS
542 the "Watershed Protection and Flood prevention
District Act of 1955"19 became the first Nevada law to
address the flood situation.

It provided for the

establishment of a watershed protection and flood
prevention district not exceeding 750,000 acres in size.
Although restricting the legislation to small watershed
areas precluded its implementation as a meaningful tool
in the struggle to control flooding, it nevertheless
represented Nevada's first feeble attempt to address
flood control, through legislation.
In any case, while political leaders deliberated
over solutions to the problem, nature continued to
inundate the city with rain storms.

On 13 June 1955, a

"tidal wave"20 of water swept across Las Vegas.
Although there were no fatalities, flooding became acute
at both the Charleston and the Bonanza underpasses.

The

storm centered over the famed Las Vegas night club strip
section of the county, turning it into a disaster area.
Mud, debris, and storm water swept eastward across and
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down Highway 91, stacking flotsam over the median strip
as far south as the Sands Hotel.

Las Vegas's sewage

treatment plant became dysfunctional under tons of silt
and mud, spewing millions of gallons of untreated raw
sewage into the lower Vegas wash.

Streets under 18

inches of flood water became impassable to motor
vehicles and, train traffic crawled to a stop.

Every

auxiliary policeman and off-duty officer responded to
the emergency providing 24 hour service to cope with the
situation.21
John Cahlan,

reported that "at least two feet of

water ran along West Charleston all the way to the Hyde
Park section.

Many residents out my way were virtually

isolated as water

backed into yards and homes from a

depth of eight to

18 inches."22

On 13 June 1955,

Senator Alan Bible discussed the matter with Las Vegas,
City Manager A.H. Kennedy, demanding immediate action.
The Senator requested that a team of Army Engineers be
contacted to make a study of the flood control options
open to the community at that time.23
The gravity of the situation, and the severity of
the damage prompted Bible to return to Washington, D.C.
and confer with Major General A.D. Sturgis, Chief of the
Corps of Engineers in Washington, D.C..

Above all else,

the Army pledged complete assistance to the Senator and
to the people of Southern Nevada.24

Filing an immediate

request for federal assistance with the United States
government under "Public Law 875, for emergency disaster
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relief, the city urged Governor Charles Russell in
Carson City to add his voice to the appeal.

Damage

estimates climbed to $3 million, before the Corps of
Engineers team finally arrived late in the summer of
1955 to make their assessment.25
Regarded as the worst storm that Las Vegas had
experienced in thirty years, it compelled the city
fathers to redouble their efforts to find solutions.
They found that the rapid increase in population coupled
with home building on small lots side by side with
insufficient drainage provisions precluded storm water
from finding a safe path through the city without
flooding.

Lands that had been previously considered

flood prone or marginal in the early days of Las Vegas's
growth now appealed to developers as prime building
sites for leapfrog development.
Many home owners seeking help and unable to find it
from local governmental agencies, sought out their
insurance agents.

According to the Review Journal,

agents and adjusters in Las Vegas spent more time
informing policy holders that their home owners'
insurance did not cover flood damage than in selling new
policies.26

One insurance agent observed that the dry

desert location together with the high cost of premiums
had deterred most residents from purchasing flood
insurance.

He concluded that few people living in arid

regions cared to pay approximately 250 dollars for a
flood insurance policy.27
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With their hopes for insurance coverage dashed,
troubled home owners turned to other sources for
assistance.

Some help came from an unexpected source,

George Gibson, Agent-in-charge of the Las Vegas branch
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, reported that under
certain conditions flood losses could be claimed as a
deductible item under the category of casualty.28
Impatient with waiting for vague or non-existent
federal plans to prevent flooding, county and city
leaders finally took action.

Mayor C.D. Baker, and his

Las Vegas city staff moved on two fronts to ease the
hazards.

First, in cooperation with the Army Engineers

on the scene, the city prepared a plan to intercept
slope borne torrents and channel them into the desert
areas north and south of the populated areas.

Second,

city planners and engineers wrote stiff new subdivision
regulations that required complete design data be
approved by the city before construction of a project or
a home began.29
These stop gap and short term measures supplemented
long range plans being developed by more visionary
elements within the community.

The public had been

alerted by the press that the Corps of Engineers survey
requested by Senator Bible had nothing to do with the
immediate problem of repairing damage to the city, but
instead represented the start of a long range program to
design flood control works.

On another front, the

Review Journal reinforced the gravity of the situation
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by announcing that Governor Charles Russell had asked
Eisenhower to declare Las Vegas a disaster area, and had
requested $600,000 from Federal Emergency Funds.3 0
On 21 June 1955, President Eisenhower, officially
declared Las Vegas a major disaster area and ordered
that $200,000 in federal funds be made available to the
city for repairs.31

North Las Vegas, in the spirit of

the frontier tradition, declined federal assistance
deciding instead to clean up the destruction with local
labor.

North Las Vegas Councilman Earl Evans stated

that "he did not believe the total amount of damage was
enough to seek federal relief funds, pointing out that
if the city should borrow federal funds it would be
necessary to repay them at a later date."32
On 28 June 1955 the Review Journal reported that
Senator Bible appeared before the Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee seeking $25,000 to conduct a detailed
survey of Las Vegas to determine the exact flood control
measures which would be needed to prevent future flash
flood damage.33 Every available federal agency had been
mustered to aid Las Vegas in its search for flood
relief.

In his testimony before the Senate

Appropriations Committee considering Public Works
appropriations for the Corps of Engineers, Bible argued
that this "This growing city cannot wait another year
before carrying off this needed investigation to map
definite work specifications to meet the situation."34
Responding to the local demand for assistance, the
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Bureau of Land Management announced that it might
construct several small detention dams in Red Rock
Canyon, west of Las Vegas, the primary source of runoff
in the recent flood.35
Finally, in 1955, the Corps of Engineers began its
study, handicapped by the lack of detailed records of
flood damage prior to 1954.

This information had not

been kept owing to the infrequency of major floods that
usually occurred many years apart.

A sparse population,

cheap land, and non-existent or minimal building codes
in the city and county building departments had offered
inexpensive alternatives to the costly construction of
flood control works.

Now the absence of historical

storm data became a nightmare for the Army as it
struggled with the planning and design of a sound
infrastructure.
In its preliminary investigation, the Corps found
that as a result of urban development and the
construction of a substantial infrastructure in suburban
sections west of the Union Pacific Railroad, the area
had become subject to damage from a flood of standard
project magnitude.3 6

(The Corps of Engineers defined a

standard project flood as a "large hypothetical flood
that would be exceeded only on rare occasions."37)

In

other words, flood works designed to withstand a
standard project storm would guarantee almost
one-hundred percent protection from flooding.

Home

building generated by land developers had not taken into
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account these major rain storms.

Moreover, thanks to

little or no government regulation, they had modified or
altered the natural drainage courses without improving
the well-defined channels throughout the urbanized parts
of the Las Vegas Wash drainage system.

Therefore,

nearly all floods originating west of the Union Pacific
Railroad caused appreciable damage to the city
especially after 1940.38
Despite the lack of information necessary for a
thorough evaluation of the problem, the Army Corps not
only prepared and documented the causes and effects of
flooding in the valley but offered solutions.

On 15

November 1955, fifty five persons attended a public
hearing that had been called by the Corps of Engineers
to discuss its plans.

To those who had suffered in

previous floods, improvements proposed and considered by
the Corps of Engineers sounded reasonable.

Civic

leaders at the meeting stated their belief that levees
and channel improvements would have prevented large
property damages and business losses resulting from
frequent flooding during past years.39
What is more, the local interests boiled down their
requests of the Corps to three main points:

first, to

prevent inundation of intensively developed residential,
commercial, and industrial areas in the cities of Las
Vegas, North Las Vegas, Henderson, and in the community
between Nellis Air Force Base and Las Vegas Wash.40
view of the savage destructive force of the flood

In
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preceding the meeting, local representatives stressed
residential protection as their primary concern.

The

second area of concentration centered on protection of
the extensively developed resort area in Las Vegas (the
Strip).

The third and final goal embodied measures to

prevent disruption of railroad transportation, highway
communication, and utility service.41
The Army supplemented local input with cost benefit
ratio studies that indicated that its plan exceeded
unity.

Essentially the cost benefit ratio focuses on

the notion that if a project produced two-hundred
dollars in benefits and cost one hundred dollars the
cost benefit ratio would be 2:1.

If the cost benefit

ratio is less than unity (one) than the project is not
worth undertaking.42

Therefore, because of the

favorable cost benefit ratio of the Las Vegas proposal
all of the governmental entities agreed that the plan
was financially sound.
In determining the scope of the project, the Corps
arrived at a three phase framework with a joint funding
formula between the local community and the Federal
Government.

The first part of the plan, known as the

Las Vegas unit, would provide protection for most of
North Las Vegas, Las Vegas, and the developed area south
of Las Vegas from floods in the Las Vegas Loop, Las
Vegas Creek, Charleston Boulevard, and Flamingo Wash
drainage area (see appendix B).43

To arrive at the

desired level of protection, the Corps proposed to
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construct one diversion levee and a detention basin
southwest of the cities of North Las Vegas and Las
Vegas.

This levee, ranging in height from four to

twenty feet above natural ground surface, would extend
for 31,000 feet generally southward from a point about
seven miles northwest of the city of Las Vegas and about
one mile southwest of Highway No. 95 to the Las Vegas
detention basin (net capacity 12,660 acre-feet) on
Flamingo wash west of the Union Pacific railroad about
five miles southwest of Las Vegas.
The outlet channel, which would be constructed
eastward for about 50,000 feet from the detention basin
to Las Vegas Wash, required a capacity ranging from
3,500 cubic feet per second at the upstream end to
20,000 at the Las Vegas Wash.

Construction of the

outlet channel would involve building one railroad
bridge and three new highway bridges.

The Las Vegas

unit also called for a second levee about one-half mile
about 1/2 mile West of the Las Vegas airport (McCarran
Field).

Approximately 6.5 feet high, this levee would

extend 8,000 feet northward from the Union Pacific
railroad, Boulder branch line to the outlet channel.44
The second phase, the Henderson Unit, would provide
protection for Henderson and adjacent industrial plants
from floods in the washes south and east of Henderson.45
To complete the plan, the Corps planned to construct the
Power Line Road unit that would safeguard the developed
area south of Nellis Air Force Base from floods in
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washes northeast and northwest of the airbase.46
Together, these two systems planned and designed by the
Corps of Engineers had covered every flood prone
urbanized district in the valley (see Appendix B ) .
At first glance, the Corps plan seemed like a gift
from heaven that would appeal to every interest in the
valley.

However, that was not to be the case.

Five

prerequisites had to be met by Clark County prior to
finalization of the plan and commencement of
construction.

On the surface, these items seemed

reasonable, but after a complete review of the proposal
the community divided into two opposing camps.

Many

found the plan unacceptable after analyzing the
conditions that the Corps intended to impose.
The local community's obligations consisted of:
(a) Provide free of cost to the United States
all lands, easements, and right-of-way necessary for the
construction of the project at a cost estimated at
$4,545,000 (June 1959).
(b) Pay for relocation of utilities, construct
necessary highway bridges, and dip crossing
relocations at a cost estimated at $385,000 (June
1959).
(c) Hold and save the United States free from
damages
due to the construction and operation of the works.
(d) Maintain and operate the improvements after
completion in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the secretary of the Army, at an annual cost
estimated at $54,000.
(e) Establish and enforce flood channel limits
and regulations satisfactory to the Secretary of the
Army, for the preservation of the flood-carrying
capacity of the recommended channel improvements.47

50

The Army Corps of Engineers accepted responsibility
for the excavation and construction of the channel and
appurtenances.

This entailed the largest percentage of

the initial cost of the works.

The local community,

however, found itself faced with the maintenance of the
project forever, and in a manner satisfactory to the
Army.

Preliminary estimates for the total cost of the

operation amounted to $18,460,000.

A cost breakdown

indicated that local entities would pay $4,930,000 while
the Federal government's share amounted to
$13,530,000.48
In an effort to solve the problem the State of
Nevada and Clark County moved on two fronts to expedite
the implementation of a flood control program.

The

first was to send Hugh Shamberger, state director of
conservation and natural resources, to Washington, D.C.,
to press for authorization for county-wide flood
control.

Meanwhile Mayor Baker, who was also chairman

of the conservation district, met with concerned
citizens and stressed the urgency of the situation.
Moreover, he tried to muster public support for the
creation of a viable program.

In his meetings, Baker

drove home the argument that the immediate problem of
right-of-way acquisition had to be faced before property
values increased.

Furthermore, he emphasized the

difficulties involved with financing the project.

Mayor

Baker went so far as to suggested that it might be
necessary to call a special session of the Nevada State
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Legislature to create a new special flood control
district.49
Establishment of a flood control district to
supplant the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention
District became a reality and the vehicle selected by
the county to manage financing, construction, and
maintenance of the project.

Legislation necessary to

achieve these ends became law in 1960.

Entitled "NRS

543"50 the Nevada law provided a permanent governmental
body that incorporated all of the tools necessary to
comply with the Corps of Engineers report.

Clark County

Commissioners acted as the Board of Directors, and all
other county elected officials became ex-officio members
of the district.

One of the most important chapters in

the law, 543.720, permitted the District to issue
general obligation bonds.

County Commissioners and

other local officials decided that the best method for
financing the local entities's share of the project
would be to sell general obligation, flood control
bonds.

This meant that an election had to be held, and

approval of the voters secured prior to the issuance of
the bonds.

Plans for the bond election gained

acceptance locally, and the date for the election was
set for 10 April, 1962."51

Officials assumed that the

general public wanted flood control in the valley, and
would vote for bonds as a means of financing the
project.

Accordingly, they instructed the County

Election Department to prepare ballots and conduct the
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election.
Unhappily for those favoring the program, the
election also presented an opportunity for special
interests within the valley, to oppose the Corps of
Engineers plan.

Voters wanted and expected protection

for the community using the least expensive methods
available.

Yet, as in all issues requiring a vote of

the general public, two sides emerged over the argument.
Those opposed to a major flood control program in Las
Vegas took the opportunity to study the Corps of
Engineers plan, and point out weaknesses to help defeat
the bond issue at the polls.
One minority group consisted of residents living on
the alluvial plain, not subjected to flooding.

They

took the position that since they lived in a safe zone
they should not be taxed to pay for other people's
mistakes.

Furthermore, they grumbled that folks ought

to have had better sense than to build or buy homes in a
flood prone section of the valley.
Land developers also viewed the flood control
project negatively because it encroached on prime land
in the Charleston Heights area west of Jones Boulevard
that they considered desirable for development.

Many

speculators had already prepared plans to construct
subdivisions in the area under appraisal for the levee
and channel west of the city.

Charleston Heights Tract

40-A represented one of the Final Maps that had been
approved by the Las Vegas City Planning Commission prior
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to the election.

Located in the path of the proposed

flood control channel, Charleston Heights Tract 40-A had
been approved by the Las Vegas Planning Commission on 27
March 1962 and the Las Vegas City Commission on 4 April
1962.

These approvals came just a few days prior to the

bond election.52
Anticipating the defeat of the bond issue at the
polls, and fearing further efforts to reactivate the
issue after the election, developers prepared to move
expeditiously to block the proposed levee west of the
city.

Additionally, a group of local consulting

engineers joined in the argument and advanced several
compelling arguments against the project.

They studied

the plans of the Corps of Engineers, and presented sound
engineering and economic reasons why the Corps plan
ought to be defeated.
Then, in March 1962, just two weeks before the
election, local engineers called a meeting with members
of the Army Corps of Engineers to advance their notion
that the $20 million dollar flood control project had
been overdesigned.53 Army representatives privately
viewed the assembly as a "cross examination",54 but
responded to the inquiry.

Louis La Porta, chairman of

the Board of County Commissioners, Oscar Scherer, George
Von Tobel, Land Surveyor Jack Levitt; Jack Turner, Clyde
Keegle, Ewalt Anderson and Boyd Yaden all engineers
except Leavitt,55 attended the confrontation and
presented arguments that the project had been
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overdesigned.
The Army responded that the design had been based
on studies conducted to establish a maximum hypothetical
storm and the relative damage and loss of life it would
cause.56 These local engineers failed to consider that
few or no records of the previous storms from flooding
in the valley existed.

Newspaper accounts of storms and

flooding contained the only reliable source of
information for the Corps.

The significance of the lack

of data on rainfall in the Las Vegas area dictated that
the Corps of Engineers had to use similar storms that
had occurred in areas like Las Vegas.
On 4 April 1962, the Review Journal, reported that
most officials predicted an easy victory for the
project.

The writer went on to say that businessmen on

the Strip, as well as land developers and speculators
strongly favored the project, and saw no reason for its
defeat.

Moreover, he bolstered his assessment of an

easy victory at the polls by noting that although there
had been voices questioning the project, no open strong
opposition to the bond issue had presented itself until
the present time.

More broadly, the press declared that

a group of professional engineers questioned the size of
the project, but had not taken a stand either favoring
or rejecting it.57
Two days later on 6 April 1962, the headlines in
the Review Journal, announced in bold black print,
"Consulting Engineers Here Oppose Flood Control Plan".58
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The consulting engineers gave several reasons for their
decision.

First they predicted that the cost could go

as high as $40-million dollars, a sum substantially
higher than that estimated by the Corps of Engineers.
Nevertheless, they admitted that the project would
protect the city of Las Vegas from severe flood damage
that occurred during a general storm over the entire
water shed.59
Central to the argument presented by local
engineers, and the one that caused the great disparity
between the Corp/s estimated costs and local estimates
resulted from the notion that because the project would
not protect areas below the proposed levee from damage,
a storm drain needed to be included in the plans.
Consulting engineers argued that the urban area could
not be adequately protected without the construction of
an underground storm drain network, and that it needed
to be built in conjunction with the main channel system
as proposed by the Army Corps of Engineers.

As a

consequence, the urban areas in Las Vegas faced an all
or nothing choice.
On Sunday 8 April 1962, an editorial in the Review
Journal, presented both sides of the story.

The press

focused upon the pragmatic notion that flood control
like all federal activities usually developed into "pork
barrel" projects, however work on the proposal ought to
go foreward for the good of the community.

They pointed

out that costs would never be less, and that some
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protection from the ravages of flooding would be better
than nothing.

Commending local consulting engineers on

their astute observations, the editor nevertheless,
encouraged voters to pass the bond issue on the 10th of
April.60
Time had run out, and the accelerated expansion
of the city in a westerly direction coupled with a
massive population explosion led the reporter to observe
that Las Vegas had already jumped beyond the temporary
dirt barrier that had been erected along its western
perimeter.61 The stage was set for the biggest bond
issue to ever appear on the ballot in Clark County until
that time.
On election day, both sides continued to press
their arguments to prospective voters.

Oscar Scherer, a

private consulting engineer and opponent of the project
speculated that La Porta (Chairman of the County
Commission) would realize his hope for approval of the
bond issue.

His main criticism focused on the idea that

the Army's flood control system did not include an
internal drainage system to drain off water that fell
below the dike area.62

The polls opened on time and the

voters began to cast their ballots.

Only owners of real

property could vote, and they did not need to be
registered to cast a ballot.63
The County Commissioners and Mayor Baker suffered a
surprising defeat.

"Voters Toss Out LV Bond Issue.

...

Less than 5000 vote here",64 proclaimed the headlines
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the day after the election.
the proposal.

The vote was 7 to 4 against

Las Vegas had lost its chance to start a

flood control program with federal assistance and it
would never be given another chance.

Discouraged public

works officials began to pick up the pieces and salvage
what they could from the ashes of defeat.

Local

Engineers, either by intent or by accident, had came
forth in the newspapers at just the right time to state
their case and had not allowed time for a rational
rebuttal by other interested parties.
Pressure from a minority pressure group left the
public in doubt about the validity of the Army Corps of
Engineers plan and the wisdom of their elected public
officials.

The argument that the proposed project would

stop flash flooding that threatened the inundation of
Las Vegas, while not protecting it from rainfall that
fell directly on the city had merit.

Nevertheless,

funding for an internal drainage system could have
waited till the later while the metropolitan area
developed and expanded its tax base.

The inability of

forces favorable to the flood measures to respond to the
consulting engineers arguments in the short span of time
between their attacks upon the plan and the election led
to the defeat of the measure.

Clark County and Las

Vegas in defeat would have to search for new sources of
financing to build flood control works for its
residents.

CHAPTER III
FROM THE ASHES OF DEFEAT
TO THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
1962— 1976

The defeat of the flood control bond issue on 10
April 1962 devastated public works officials and local
entities.

County Commissioner White in stunned

disbelief observed that "The public doesn't realize what
it has done to itself."1

In an attempt to save the day

Richard Sauer, Director of Public Works for the City of
Las Vegas, suggested that an alternative solution to the
Corps of Engineers' plan would be to seek cooperation
from state and county agencies to turn Rainbow Avenue
into a combination dike and highway.2

Rainbow Avenue

paralleled the main flood control channel proposed by
the Army Engineers, and Sauer believed that a dirt levee
could be constructed cheaply.
Sauer expected the proposed dike to provide a
limited amount of protection for the city from flash
flooding that came from the Spring mountains west of Las
Vegas.

He argued that the combination highway-dike

would intercept most of the storm water, although unlike
the Corps plan, it would not channel it directly into
the lower Vegas wash.

It presented an inexpensive

alternative for the community.
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Along with Sauer,
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frustrated public officials debated other alternatives
for dealing with the problem, while the community
continued to urbanize, sprawling over into the
surrounding flood prone areas.
Each of the political entities located within the
Las Vegas basin zealously guarded its political
independence, choosing to make its own political and
economic decisions, often without consulting its
neighbors.

Failure of the bond issue contributed to the

polarization of local governments by introducing
conflict over construction methods, means of financing,
size of proposed projects, and the location of future
flood control works.

Flooding, the only common element

in the situation facing the communities in Southern
Nevada, lost its significance in the ensuing economic
and political conflicts that arose among the entities.
Thunderstorms and raging torrents of flood water
failed to respect artificial boundaries erected by
legislative fiat.

Storm water continued to flow in its

original channel, ignoring homes, streets or other
objects artificially erected in its pathway.

Some

concerned officials believed that one useful vehicle to
help solve the valley's mounting flood problems lay in
the utilization of the Flood Control District law.

It

had been enacted by the Nevada State Legislature in 1960
for the administration of the proposed Army Engineer's
flood control plan.

Established as a regional agency,

the Clark County Flood Control District contained all of
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the tools necessary to bring consensus to the municipal
entities.
Unfortunately for these officials the District had
not become functional prior to the bond election, and
existed solely as a paper entity.

Without funding for

personnel to plan and engineer projects, or the means to
construct flood works the district had no value to the
community.

Although city and county engineers continued

to isolate problems and design structures to ameliorate
hazards, without financial backing their efforts
resulted in meaningless stacks of useless blueprints.
The nexus in the flood control equation binding
communities in the valley together had been the
proposition that flooding presented a deadly hazard in
every entity regardless of political boundaries.

On the

other hand, continuing conflict over the allocation of
state tax dollars to local communities created friction
and fueled ongoing adversarial political relationships.
Clark County, Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, and Henderson
each struggled to retain the power to oversee the
expenditure of funds within its own borders.

Moreover,

Commissioners looked suspiciously at any institution not
under their political supervision, especially empowered
to spend scarce tax revenue in parts of the county other
than their own.

More than anything else, this atavistic

notion encouraged political gridlock among the various
communities, and shaped flood control planning during
the 1960s and 1970s.
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When faced with competing demands for tax revenues
from an expanding population base for schools, social
programs, hospitals, police, and fire departments, flood
control took a back seat.

The normally mild climate,

together with one of the lowest annual rainfall rates in
the country continued to lull residents into a false
sense of security.

Touted as a tourist mecca and desert

paradise by the Chamber of Commerce and the news media,
Las Vegas in the 1960s assumed a reputation of security
that belied the hazards from flood storms.

Realists who

continued to remind local residents that floods could
and would strike the valley again often achieved the
status of iconoclastic pessimists.
Each political subdivision realized that storm
water had to flow through the Las Vegas and Flamingo
Washes where they crossed municipal boundaries yet
officials could not agree upon the size or the location
of the works to be constructed.

Recognizing the need

for unity of purpose, the various communities decided to
fund a master drainage plan.

In 1963, they jointly

retain VTN of Nevada, a consulting engineering firm, to
compile the necessary data and prepare the "Las Vegas
Master Drainage Plan."3

The plan identified all of the

major channels passing through the valley.

This master

plan guided the cities and county on the optimum
location for proposed flood control works and size of
channels.

Local public works departments could, and

did, alter the size of the recommended channels to fit
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their budgets or political views.

Furthermore, each

entity funded and constructed only those parts of
channels that flowed through its jurisdiction, when and
if it deemed it necessary.
Lacking money and pressed by the demands of the
people for schools and social services, community
leaders of the various entities left flood control to
their planning and engineering departments.

Both groups

constantly stressed the importance of preserving the
integrity of natural washes and attempted to control
land development in flood prone areas by requesting
their governing bodies pass planning and zoning
ordinances.

As early as 1975, public works officials

attempted to place restrictions on land developers,
builders, and contractors when they believed it to be in
the public interest and in accordance with local and
state statutes.
These restrictions, presented as staff
recommendations to the City and County Commissioners,
detailed the flood control situation prior to final
approval of the plans for construction.

The outcome of

this loose inter-governmental situation resulted in the
construction of inadequate, piecemeal flood control
works.

On 5 July 1975, the Review Journal accurately

described the situation by reporting that land
developers and construction crews often filled up washes
to accommodate subdivisions while diverting the flow of
storm water onto other property that had not been
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subjected to flooding.

The picture of upstream concrete

flood

works emptying into a subdivision that had been

built

in a flood plain as the result of greedy land

speculation or poor planning made news.
The Review Journal bitterly denounced the ongoing
land development process as "backward construction1^ ,
and focused attention on the poorly funded system that
encouraged the construction of channels whose segments
often did not connect with each other or had differing
depths and widths.

Attempting to concentrate public

attention on the need for flood control, the newspapers
often

spoke out for reform.

The defeat of the bond

issue

at the polls, however,rendered their efforts

a

lost cause.
The day-to-day attempts of public works officials
to cope with an expanding population, while hampered by
under staffed and underfunded departments, precluded the
planning or development of an adequate infrastructure.
Inexpensive land in marginal areas yielded a larger
profit than similar land located in sites that were free
from flooding.

Despite the efforts of well intentioned

governmental officials, land developers continued to
seek methods to avoid paying for costly flood control
measures necessary to protect their developments.
As a last resort, local entities began requiring
engineers to calculate the volume of storm water that
paved streets would carry during a rain storm of a
defined magnitude.

Using streets and alleys to carry
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surface runoff in lieu of costly channels, culverts, and
storm drains during floods became standard practice for
land developers.

The theory had been tried, tested, and

adopted in the pioneer days of the settlement of Las
Vegas, and once again became the method chosen to
dispose of surface drainage.

Acceptance of this archaic

system by the general public, with its flooded streets,
water damaged homes, and disrupted communications
systems indicated their acquiescence in the atavistic
ideology that had dominated the city since its inception
as a railroad division point.
The notion of raising taxes to fund a
comprehensive system of flood control found little
support with the public.

Despite the parsimonious mood

of the taxpayers and the State Legislature, County
Public Works Director, George Monahan intended to
upgrade the program with the appointment of James
Scholl, as Deputy Director of Public Works for Flood
Control and Off-Sites in 1971.

Scholl's budget for the

1972-1973 fiscal year was a meager $35,441.5

These

funds, had been earmarked for flood control in the
county's urban Las Vegas area as well as the towns of
Mesquite, Bunkerville, Overton, and Logandale.
The limited funds barely covered the Deputy
Director's salary and cost of cataloging existing flood
structures and hazards within the county.

But in 1974,

after identifying the worst problems, the County
Commission allocated $700,000 to flood control for the
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express purpose of launching an interim program.
Moreover, in January of 1974 the commissioners approved
the county flood control division to sign a $44,500
contract with Baughman, Haught and Turner Inc.,
Consulting Engineers, to start work on the top
priority— design of a flood control channel on Monson
Road between Nellis Boulevard and the Las Vegas Wash.6
Although many more small projects followed, they
were reactions to events rather than results of advanced
planning.

The other communities of the valley had also

begun to establish flood works along the major washes
within their boundaries.

Generally, engineers followed

the VTN master plan for the location of their projects;
however, the size of the works often prompted
disagreement between the entities.

Yet, each city

independently funded the total cost of the project
through their respective areas.

On the national level,

flood control had captured the interest of the federal
government, mainly because of severe flooding in the
eastern part of the United States especially in the
Mississippi Valley.
In the mid-1960s, the federal government began to
address the need for non-structural approaches to flood
loss reduction through land use planning, building,
construction standards, and an insurance program.
Federal agencies concerned with flooding recognized that
some sections of the country suffered flood damage year
after year and that financial losses to the public at
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large were becoming intolerable.
The United States Congress finally responded to the
crisis by passing the National Flood Insurance Act in
1968 and the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973. The
heart of this legislation was the identification and
mapping of flood prone areas within the United States.
Federal insurance rates in turn focused upon the
elevation of existing and proposed construction above
the identified flood plain shown on the government's
maps as the basis for insurance premiums.

The property

owner paid a premium amount based upon the probability,
predictability, and frequency of flooding of his
property within the identified flood hazard.

Many local

communities throughout the United States did not want to
participate in the program.

Federal authorities,

however, made it impossible for them to avoid entering
the plan.
Clark County was scheduled to enter the program on
1 July 1975.

The lever used to guarantee both entry and

compliance with the program came from Washington's
threat to withhold federal funds from the county.

To

show its determination the Federal Insurance
Administration issued an edict stating that if Clark
County failed to enter the program within the prescribed
time, it would institute a moratorium on all loans for
new construction and mortgages from lending institutions
insured under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

(FDIC)

On 7 October 1974, at the regular meeting of the
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County Commission, Deputy Director of Flood Control,
James Scholl appeared before the Board to seek
authorization for the county to institute the necessary
paper work to make flood insurance available to the
people of Clark County under the National Flood
Insurance Program of 1973.

Scholl told the Board that

enrollment had to be accomplished prior to 1 July 1975
to ensure the continuation of federal funds for Clark
County.7

The motion to proceed with the application

passed the Board of Commissioners unanimously.
Entry into the insurance program required the
passage by the County Commission of two resolutions,
Resolution "A" and Resolution "B".

Resolution "A"

recognized that certain sections of Clark County had
been subjected to periodic flooding from streams and
washes causing serious damage to properties at those
locations.

Furthermore, the county resolved to enact

and maintain in force for those areas having flood
hazards adequate land use and control measures together
with enforcement provisions consistent with the criteria
set forth in section 1910 of the National Flood
Insurance Program Regulation.

Moreover, Clark County

vested the Flood Control Division, of its Department of
Public Works with the responsibility, authority, and
means to maintain for public inspection, and to furnish
upon request, a record of elevations (in relation to sea
level) of the lowest floor (including basement) of all
new or substantially improved structures located in the
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special flood hazard areas.

If the lowest floor

elevation was below grade on one or more sides, the
elevation of the floor immediately above also needed to
be recorded.8
At the same meeting, County Commissioners passed
Resolution "B" that verified the fact that the county
had adopted the "Uniform Building Code, 1973 Edition,
(International Conference of Building Officials).9

This

resolution strengthened the enforcement of flood control
procedures and minimized future abuses by local
developers and contractors, who often failed to take
into account the problem of flooding.

The Commission

directed Scholl to review all plans submitted for
building permits to ascertain that all public
facilities, such as sewer, gas, electrical, and water
systems are located, elevated, and constructed to
minimize or eliminate flood damage.10
Using the newly approved resolutions, Scholl made
application for Clark County to the Federal Insurance
Administrator for flood insurance under the Flood
Disaster Protection Act of 1973.

On 3 0 May 1975, the

Acting Federal Insurance Administrator, J. Robert
Hunter, once again clarified the government's intention
to freeze local financing for building construction.il
Barely a month later on 4 July 1975, the Review
Journal announced that, just in time for torrential
rains and flooding streets, Clark County had been
accepted into the National Flood Insurance Program.12
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Hunter, acting Federal Insurance Administrator predicted
that the new program would offer "the best way of
protecting property owners from the ravages of floods,
while easing the burden on the general public."13
That day, 4 July 1975, the worst storm since the
1950s struck Las Vegas sending damage estimates into the
millions of dollars.

Two men died in the storm, which

was believed to be the most destructive flood to hit Las
Vegas in twenty years.

The men, both North Las Vegas

street workers, perished under a wall of flood water
that swept their vehicle off the road.

Scholl reported

to the news media that most of the damage in the valley
related to homes and autos and that preliminary damage
estimates exceeded two million dollars.

Larry Hampton,

Las Vegas Director of Public Works, reported that the
City's sewage system had been put out of service, and
fixed the city's cost of repairs at more than $100,000.
At the federal level, Robert Stevens had been dispatched
to the area to assist with damage assesment.14
Pointing to a factor unique in the Las Vegas flood
control equation, Bob Whitney, Public Works Director of
Henderson, observed in an interview with reporters from
the Review Journal that flood control is something that
no one needs until it rains; He further observed that
many residents, as well as some government officials,
when advised about flood danger, gaze at the cloudless
sky in disbelief and say: "Flood?

Here?"15

The

significance of the rhetorical question and answer
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highlight the misconception that desert areas are immune
to flood hazards.
In the wake of the flood of 1975 Army Corps of
Engineers economist Dan Young and Hydraulic Engineer Tim
Yeh began collecting data in Las Vegas for future
possible designs of flood works.

Swamped with requests

for assistance from local residents, the Corps's
representatives responded that they came to Las Vegas to
collect information, "not begin any construction or take
complaints from the residents."16

They suggested that

any information helpful to the Corps could be mailed to
James Scholl at Clark County's Flood Control
Department.17
Seventy years of drainage problems and flooding
caused by the construction of impervious surfaces such
as paved streets, parking lots, and roof tops in
conjunction with Las Vegas's population explosion
resulted in a legal challenge to the County's adaptation
and use of the civil law doctrine as the principle for
adjudicating damages between property owners.

In 1976,

a number of local residents jointly filed an action
against Clark County for damages sustained to their
properties.

The lower court agreed with the plaintiff,

and entered a judgment for just compensation and damages
against Clark County.
Clark County's District Attorney, Robert Miller,
appealed to the Nevada State Supreme Court for relief.18
Speaking for the Court, Justice Mowbray held that the
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lower court correctly adopted the "reasonable use" rule
for determining competing rights between landowners and
the County.

Furthermore, the high court held that the

land-owner's situation had been caused by the County's
unreasonable acts, making it "liable for such
injuries."19 Judge Mowbray's decision overturned the
foundation upon which drainage disputes had been settled
in Las Vegas and other parts of the southwestern United
States for decades.
There are three basic legal doctrines that dictate
the adjudication of flood water in the United States,
the "common enemy doctrine", the "civil law rule", and
the "rule of reasonable use".

The common enemy doctrine

stipulates that property owners have the right to do as
they please with their land.

Moreover, they can fend

off hostile storm waters and refuse to allow them to
enter or cross their property.

Furthermore, they need

not take into account the consequences of damage to
other surrounding land owners.

It is apparent, even to

the casual observer, that this principle is of no
practical value in addressing flood problems in urban
areas.20
Diametrically opposed to the common enemy doctrine
is the civil law concept.

As noted earlier, the civil

law rule states that the lower land owner must accept
any surface water that drains onto his property but the
upper owner has no right to increase the quantity of
water over the amount that would have occurred
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naturally.

Civil law rule traces its roots back to

Roman law, and more recently to the Code Napoleon.
Clark County had used the civil law rule as its guiding
legal principle since the founding of the community, and
the State of California has followed the rule for over
one-hundred years.21
The strength of the civil law rule places the
burden of flooding upon those who purchase the land,
requiring that they accept it subject to the natural
drainage conditions.22 This concept fit the
individualism of the founding fathers of the city, as
well as the pioneering spirit of the early
European-American settlers in the region.

Furthermore,

use of the legal plan added support to the community's
parsimonious philosophy toward the expenditure of tax
money for flood control works.
Judge Mowbray's decision in favor of the reasonable
use rule constituted a substantial departure from
contemporary legal ideology in the 1970s.

Its

acceptance over the common enemy rule and civil law
concept forced the community and public works officials
to consider new options when dealing with land
development and flood control issues.23 Essentially, the
opinion focused on factors other than the location of
the litigants' land with respect to their downstream
neighbors' boundary line.

After Mowbray's decision,

each and every case had to be judged upon all of the
urban development that had taken place on land in a
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watershed contributing surface water onto a property
situated further downstream.
Public works officials argued that because all
urban development increased the ratio of rainfall to
runoff, every new construction project in the County
increased the probability for future flooding and
litigation.

Moreover, by continuing to issue building

permits without the construction of an underground storm
drain system or other positive drainage facility, local
governments, as approving agencies assumed the liability
for property damage resulting from flooding.

In

essence, they perceived that municipal construction and
land development might be slowed or halted because of
the change in legal philosophy.
The legal action taken by Powers, Lowe, et al,
against Clark County clearly illustrated and defined the
situation.24 In the 1950s and 1960s, Powers, Lowe, et
al. purchased property on the banks of a dry wash
outside of the urban center of the community near Topaz
Street and Desert Inn Road.

Rain storms had eroded a

natural channel through their land on its way to the
Flamingo Wash.

At the time of their purchase, flooding

rarely occurred because of the gentle slope, small
amount of storm water, porous soil conditions, and lack
of nuisance water.25

These conditions prevailed until

the mid 1970s, when pressure from an expanding
population increased the density of new home
construction, apartment dwellings, and shopping centers
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upstream from the litigants property.
New development with its asphalt streets, concrete
sidewalks, and impervious roof tops brought an increased
volume of nuisance water as well as an accelerated flow
of storm water through the litigant/s property.

The

intermittent stream had been transformed into a
continuous free-flowing creek complete with reeds,
mosquitos, and other aquatic life.

Under the civil law

doctrine, Powers and his neighbors would have had no
recourse other than to accept the surface water onto
their property and discharge onto their neighbor's land.
Each one knowingly built his home in a marginal flood
hazard and had no redress other than to accept the water
onto their property, and to discharge it on the land of
their neighbor downstream.
During the eleven-day trial, the litigants based
their case on the theories of reasonable use and argued
the legal points of inverse condemnation, nuisance, and
trespass.

Furthermore, the litigants demanded that

Clark County pay them for their injuries and purchase
the Powers property in its entirety, because it had no
further value other than as a flood channel.26

Judge

Mowbray agreed with the inverse condemnation charge of
illegally taking a property without just compensation.
Attorneys for Powers, et al. further argued that one
landowner could not enrich himself at the expense of
another.

The County rebutted the plaintiff's arguments

by citing the notion that it was "not liable for
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injuries caused by what it terms 'urbanization' or rapid
economic growth."27

The court responded to the County's

argument with the statement, "We cannot agree."28
Clark County's loss of the Powers, Lowe case
demonstrated the need for long-term planning,
construction, and maintenance of a flood control
infrastructure in the Las Vegas Valley.

More broadly,

it synthesized the community's perceptions of the
effects of urbanization on the drainage eco-system in
the valley, and led to a complete re-evaluation of the
flood control program.

Additionally, future land

developers, landowners, and officials had to consider
the full consequences of their plans upon the community
before approving them for final implementation.29
More importantly, it forced a fundamental ideological
change from a frontier mentality of individualism to the
concept of collective community action.
The development of flood control in the Las Vegas
Valley followed the lines of least resistance.

Most of

the year the residents accepted the dry fair weather
bestowed upon them by nature.

Living in a small town,

surrounded by vast areas of cheap land, and with one of
the lowest annual rainfall rates in the country the
people failed to perceive the dangers of flooding.
Events greater than the dreams of the early European
American settlers overtook the railroad community, and
forced it and its people to change their personal
outlook from that of free pioneering spirits living on

the last frontier in the United States to members of
large cosmopolitan city.

EPILOGUE

Eighty five years after the founding of Las Vegas,
residents continue to speculate about the hazards of
flooding.

On 11 August 1991, the Review Journal

reported that rain and lightning hit the valley starting
fires and closing streets to vehicular traffic.1

The

storm caused Marian Timmerman to recall the death of her
friend Misty Alexander who drowned in a flood channel at
Topaz and Russell roads during the flood in June 1990.
Her death and the property damages estimated to have
been about 8.7 million dollars resulting from the summer
floods of 1990 illustrated the community's legacy of
failure through ignorance and neglect of the flood
control problem.

Flood control officials concede that

they are trying to remedy years of mistakes, and
inattention to the problem but that playing "catch up"
is difficult.2
The errors, inattention, and mistakes that
prevented an effective response to the dangers of
flooding can be attributed to politics, greed, and
economics.

Counter-factually, if the voters had passed

the bond election in the early 1960s, and accepted the
Army Corps of Engineers plan, the hazards from flooding
could have been lessened.

Those who argued for the

defeat of the bond issue failed to grasp the
significance between no flood control system or a
77
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partial system that could be expanded at a later date.
Despite the continuing arguments and finger pointing
about the failure to remedy the dangers from flooding,
they still exist.

George Monahan put the situation in

context when he said: "It wasn't ignorance, it wasn't
pressure, it wasn't anything else, except the money just
wasn't available for flood control measures."3
The decision by County leaders to design streets to
carry flood water rather than constructing storm drains
resulted from a parsimonious economic approach.
Political expediency dictated that social programs take
precedence over flood control in the bureaucratic
struggle for public funds.

Lack of significant annual

rainfall in the Las Vegas Valley permitted local leaders
to justify the denial of funds for an expensive storm
drain.4
On 11 August 1991, Urban Livengood, a Clark County
Deputy Director of Public Works noted that the drainage
practice in Clark County's early development dictated
leaving flood control decisions to private developers.5
Public Works Director, George Monahan concurred with
Livengood's perception that land developers exerted a
strong influence on matters pertaining to flood control.
According to Monahan, developers often sought permission
to divert storm water on to property other than their
own, and "this was fine.
it, nobody could blame us.
liability."6

As long as we didn't authorize
We wouldn't have the

It is here, in both Livengood's and
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Monahan's perceptions, that we can see the effects of
the early settlers philosophical notions of
individualism, and the reason for the court's decision
to overturn the Civil Law Doctrine.

Furthermore, the

biased attitude of the political leaders of the
community in favor of land developers and speculators
often acted to deter dedicated employees from acting in
the best interests of the public.
The case of Wishing Well Ranches #5 illustrates the
friction that often occurred because public works
officials attempted to protect the residents from the
hazards of flooding.

On 29 September 1976, Don Ware, a

homeowner who lived at 8041 South Wishing Well Road
wrote the County Flood Control Division complaining that
new construction by a land developer and contractor had
occurred behind his home, increasing the probability of
flooding to his property.7 James Scholl, Deputy Director
of Public Works, responded to the letter by conducting a
field investigation of the area.

Scholl agreed with Mr.

Ware that a problem existed and that the developer's
engineer would be notified of the problem and directed
to take remedial action to ameliorate the situation.
After being notified of the homeowner's fears, the
engineer employed by the developer responded in writing
to Scholl.
On 26 October 1977, the engineer submitted a
written report that asserted that the new construction
enhanced the situation rather than increased the danger
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to the property owner.

Furthermore, the engineer argued

that the area would not flood and presented his approved
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) plans to
substantiate his position.8 Scholl disagreed with the
engineer's assessment, however, but when faced with the
written report and the FHA approved plans, he allowed
construction to proceed.

On 16 August 1977, a rainstorm

flooded Wishing Well Ranch Subdivision.
A meeting took place in Wishing Well Ranch on 18
August 1977 among the engineer, land developer,
contractor, and residents.

Scholl stood by his original

claim that the
new construction had increased the possibility of
flooding in the area.

The developer countered that both

FHA and Clark County had approved the plans and
therefore he should not be held responsible for the
damages.

Scholl took the position that the County's

policy toward developers ought to be more rigorously
enforced and promised in the future to review their
plans more closely in an effort to better protect the
public.
Enraged by Scholl's statement, the developer on 18
August 1977 wrote to Thalia Dondero, Chairman of the
Clark County Commission, asserting that Scholl had set
himself up as "judge, jury, and executioner."9
Moreover, the developer wondered whether such a threat
by a county employee constituted a case for the district
attorney, the courts, or if it was simply an
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administrative problem.10

In any event, Scholl ended

the inquiry by responding in writing to Chairman Dondero
stating the facts surrounding the issue.11

Cought

between the political forces that controlled local
government and a private sector motivated by profit
often left well intentioned public employees such as
Scholl in an untenable situation.
The difficulty in enforcing community standards by
government officials is clearly illustrated in the
foregoing situation.

It also illustrated the pressing

need for reform of the legal system that had manifested
itself in the Powers, Lowe v Clark County court case
that overturned the archaic Civil Law Doctrine and the
frontier philosophy.
The courts in their wisdom set new legal standards
requiring the approving governmental agency to accept
financial responsibility for the approval of plans and
building permits.

Forced by law, local governmental

agencies had to enforce rigid flood control measures in
flood prone areas.

However, the struggle over flood

control continued on another front.

On 11 November

1992, the Review Journal reported that land developers
continued to seek a re-definition of flood area maps in
Clark County.

These maps provide the basis for flood

insurance rates in Clark County.
Under pressure from land developers the Federal
government with a stroke of the pen can make the flood
hazard zones disappear from the maps, but will the

82

danger go away?

John Hall, a reporter for the Review

Journal observed that "in Southern Nevada, where it is
difficult to distinguish the developers from some city
councilmen and county commissioners, these questions are
bound to have more than one answer."12

Therein lies the

core truth for many of the flood control failures as
well as the future of flood control in the Las Vegas
Valley.
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